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The Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive has had an undeniable impact on waste management 
throughout the European Union. Whereas recycling and recovery targets are the same, member states 
still enjoy a considerable degree of freedom with respect to the practical organization and management 
strategies adopted. Nevertheless, in all cases, the industry (which brings packaging material onto the 
market) should be responsible for the costs associated with packaging waste recycling/recovery 
(following the extended producer responsibility principle). The current paper compares and contrasts the 
institutional frameworks and financial costs and benefits of waste management operators for Belgium 
and Portugal. The unit costs of selective collection and sorting of packaging waste are provided for both 
countries. In Belgium, the extra-costs of recycling seem to be fully supported by the industry (through 
Fost Plus, the national Green Dot agency). In Portugal the fairness of the recycling system depends on 
the perspective adopted (economic or strictly financial). Adopting a strictly financial perspective, it 
seems that Sociedade Ponto Verde (SPV, the Portuguese Green Dot agency) should increase the 
transfers to local authorities. However, the conclusions differ for this country if the avoided costs with 
refuse collection and other treatment are taken into account. 
Keywords: Belgium; extended producer responsibility; green dot; packaging waste; Portugal; recycling. 
 
1. Introduction 
The focus of the European Union to improve Europe’s resource efficiency has resulted in several, often 
ambitious, directives related to waste management (for an overview, see Cruz et al., in press). In 
particular the Packaging and Packaging Waste (PPW) Directive, which sets targets for recycling and 
recovery of packaging waste, has had an undeniable impact on local packaging waste management 
throughout the EU. Despite the fact that exact targets are determined by the PPW Directive, the 
member states still enjoy a considerable degree of freedom with respect to the practical organization 
and management strategies adopted. The subsequent heterogeneity in policy choices has prompted the 
very pertinent issue of the effectiveness and efficiency of the adopted management strategies. Although 
the optimal strategy depends on the local situation and is often driven by historic investments in waste 
collection and processing infrastructure, comparisons between countries can still generate useful 
insights.  
Even though several authors have already analyzed the performance of the EU member states in terms 
of recycling and recovery rates (see, for example, Hage and Söderholm, 2008; Alwaeli, 2010 or Marques 
et al., 2012a), some issues deserve further consideration. In particular, the balance between the costs 
incurred by the (local) waste management operators and the financial support from the companies 
responsible for bringing the packaging material onto the market (i.e. the industry), has received little 
attention by scholars. A notable exception, however, can be found in Cruz et al., in press). By comparing 
the financial costs and benefits for Portugal, France, Romania, Germany and the UK, the authors were 
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able to identify key differences between the economic viability of the packaging recycling systems in 
these countries. For Belgium, however, such a comparison has not yet been reported.  
Also in this scope, Bailey (2002) examined the economic benefits of environmental taxes and other 
market based mechanisms centered on studies of the PPW Directive. The importance of economic 
mechanisms for the success of the packaging waste management policy is quite clear. Moreover, the 
technology adopted in waste collection, transportation, sorting, treatment, disposal and recycling and 
the institutional arrangements in place are also crucial aspects with an impact on the viability of the 
‘recycling system’ (Bohm et al., 2010). Although recycling waste from municipal systems may be 
economically efficient (Lavee, 2007), all these variables must be considered and the packaging waste 
must be managed through an integrated system (Alwaeli, 2010; e.g. sorting and recycling of some flows 
together with the incineration and/or landfilling of other flows). In a recent study, Massarutto et al. 
(2011) modeled several scenarios considering different source separation levels (SSL). By achieving 
higher SSL rates, the quality of materials collected is expected to be lower and, therefore, more waste 
going from sorting to treatment is produced. The need to consider waste management as an integrated 
process is emphasized by these authors. At a regional level, recycling and incineration with energy 
recovery are not mutually exclusive alternatives to minimize landfilling rates. Massarutto et al. (2011) 
also point out to a 50% SSL threshold (for Italy) above which no positive externalities outweigh the 
financial costs. 
A thorough understanding of the drivers of the economic viability, both at the economic and strategic 
levels, could indeed generate relevant insight for the competent authorities to design an effective and 
efficient resource management strategy. Thus, this paper will scrutinize the Belgian system and compare 
it with the case of Portugal (previously addressed in Cruz et al., 2012). This case could reveal interesting 
insights for two main reasons. First, with a recycling rate of almost 80% for household and industrial 
packaging waste in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012), Belgium proves to have a highly effective system. Moreover, 
the high recycling rate is reflected in the general recycling target for packaging waste set by the Belgian 
authorities (this target of 80% is considerably more ambitious than the 60% goal put forward in the PPW 
Directive). However, the impact of this strategic policy choice on the economic viability of the recycling 
system has yet to be analyzed. Second, the financial consequences of the adopted management model in 
Belgium might trigger further discussion on the relevance of appropriate economic incentives and the 
general design of the recycling system. In particular, the impact of inter-municipal cooperation (IMC), the 
system of financial transfers, as well as the organization of separate collection of packaging waste might 
be of interest to both scholars as policy makers.  
Before describing the general institutional framework, some issues deserve additional discussion. First, it 
is not our goal to compare the Belgian packaging waste recycling strategy with the strategy of all other 
EU member states. We rather opt to restrict our comparison to Portugal, a country for which the 
relevant data is readily available and which has the advantage of being used as a benchmark due to its 
comparability with the general structure of the packaging waste management system in Belgium. 
Second, the decision structure with respect to packaging waste for both Belgium and Portugal consists of 
a mix of decentralized and centralized competencies. Therefore, the focus will be at the level where the 
operational decisions are taken (i.e. the municipalities or multi-municipal companies). In other words, 
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this paper intends to compare the economic viability of packaging waste recycling in Belgium and 
Portugal from the perspective of the local authorities responsible for collecting and processing packaging 
waste. Third, the case of Portugal has already been extensively discussed in Cruz et al. (2012) and Cruz et 
al. (in press), which allows this paper to focus on the case of Belgium and use Portugal as a benchmark. 
Fourth and finally, although the PPW Directive covers both household and industrial packaging waste, 
this paper only analyses the economic viability of the household packaging waste strategy.  
After this brief introduction, section 2 provides an overview of the institutional setting (rules and 
responsibilities) of the Belgian and Portuguese packaging waste recycling systems. Section 3 discusses 
the different selective collection types, governance models and financial mechanisms implemented by 
these two countries. The methodology adopted in this paper to compare and contrast the two systems is 
presented in section 4 whereas the results of this analysis are discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional framework 
Since 1993, the Belgian environmental and waste policies have been transferred to the regional 
governments (i.e. Brussels Capital region, the Walloon region and the Flemish region). Nevertheless, 
certain national policy competencies still have an explicit impact on regional waste management. In 
particular product standardization and product taxation - two national competencies – have intersecting 
areas with waste policy. In the Flemish region, waste management is ruled by the Regional Statute of 14 
December 2011 (Belgian Gazette, 2012a). The practical implementation of the principles outlined in the 
Statute is further specified in a bundle of Flemish regulations called VLAREMA, which entered into force 
together with the statute. In the Walloon region, waste management is regulated by the Regional 
Statute of 27 June 1996 on waste and revised on 10 May 2012 (Belgian Gazette, 2012b), while the 
Brussels region approved a new ordinance on 14 July 2012 (Belgian Gazette, 2012c). Although in Belgium 
packaging waste management is a regional competence, a cooperation agreement concluded in 1996 
between the three regions (i.e. Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels-Capital region) harmonizes the 
packaging waste policy across the entire Belgian territory. The agreement transposes the EU Directive 
94/62/EC (amended by the EU directive 2004/12/EC) into Belgian law.  
Countries transposing the PPW Directives into national law, essentially introduce the so-called extended 
producer responsibility for packaging waste. This responsibility implies that companies which are 
responsible for bringing packaging material onto the local market are required to guarantee certain 
recovery and recycling targets for their packaging materials. In Belgium and Portugal (this country 
implemented the PPW Directive in 1997) companies may either develop their own system for taking 
back and processing their packaging waste or make an agreement with an officially accredited 
organization. In other words, the industry may delegate its packaging waste take-back responsibilities to 
an authorized third party (this applies to most EU countries). In Belgium, the private non-profit 
organization Fost Plus is the only endorsed company carrying out the take-back obligation for household 
packaging waste, while in Portugal the recycling system of household packaging waste is managed by 
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Sociedade Ponto Verde (SPV).1 These are the so-called Green Dot companies. As for most companies it is 
economically inefficient (and/or physically or logistically impossible) to organize their own collection and 
separation programs, the vast majority opts for the second alternative.2 
Although many practical details differ, the general structure of the packaging waste management system 
in Belgium and Portugal is similar. In particular, the organization of the material and financial flows are 
similar to a large extent (Figure 1 provides a general representation of this system). In both countries 
member companies pay a fee to the Green Dot company. The exact fee, however, is country specific (see 
Marques et al., 2012b and Marques et al., 2013 for a detailed description of these so-called Green Dot 
fees). As producers are likely to incorporate this cost in the price of the consumer goods, the households 
(more specifically, the consumers of the packaged products) are ultimately the ones that finance the 
Green Dot fee. The Green Dot company uses this revenue, among other ends to finance the collection 
and separation of packaging waste. Nevertheless, the Green Dot company is not responsible for the 
practical organization of those collection and separation activities, as legislation in both countries 
requires the municipalities to ensure the management of household waste. However, to exploit 
economies of scale when providing the waste related services, municipalities can engage in inter-
municipal cooperation (IMC) with other, often neighboring, municipalities. Consequently, the 
municipalities or the multi-municipal organizations (henceforth called MMOs for simplicity) emerging 
from IMC receive a contribution from the Green Dot company for organizing the collection and sorting of 
packaging waste. Finally, any revenue generated via selling the recyclable (i.e. sorted) household 
packaging material, is also used to fund the activities of the Green Dot company. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
3. Comparing packaging waste management models 
3.1 Scope of the comparison 
Since it is our goal to compare the economic viability of the packaging waste recycling strategies adopted 
in Belgium and Portugal, this section will elaborate on the practical and organizational differences 
between both countries. Keeping in mind that the aim is to analyze the economic viability from the 
perspective of the local authorities responsible for collecting and processing urban waste, the focus will 
be on those elements which may have an impact on the cost structure of the municipalities and/or inter-
municipal organizations. In particular, we will zoom in on the differences between 1) the collection 
                                                          
1
 Note that SPV is currently also licensed to manage trade and industrial packaging waste In Portugal. In Belgium 
Val-I-Pac is the counterpart for industrial packaging waste. 
2
 In Belgium only 250 companies fulfilled the take-back obligation themselves (IVCIE, 2012) while 5,235 companies 
outsourced their take-back obligation to Fost Plus by 2010 (Fost Plus, 2011). In Portugal about 10,008 contracts 
were signed with packers by the end of 2010 (Marques et al., 2011). 
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system, 2) IMC and outsourcing decisions and 3) the financial mechanisms. Some key figures linked to 
the latter three elements are included in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Both countries show a wide range in terms of population and area coverage per MMO, irrespectively of 
their demographic situations. In Belgium, almost all MMOs are located in urban areas; however, for 
example, there is one MMO (in a rural area) that only covers about 34 thousand inhabitants and the 
largest urban MMO operates for more than 1 million inhabitants. In Portugal, the range is even larger 
(14,806 – 1,554,066 inhabitants). Moreover, around 50% of the Portuguese population (including the 
Islands of Madeira and Açores) is served by rural MMOs. 
 
3.2 Collection system 
In Belgium and Portugal the level of service of packaging waste collection sometimes differs between the 
MMOs. For instance, the number of collection rounds or the number of pick-up points, influences the 
ease of recycling for the residents, but also has an important impact on the cost structure of the MMOs. 
The Green Dot company in Belgium, therefore, only reimburses the costs of a pre-determined “standard” 
level of service. This includes separate collection at the source of glass, paper and cardboard and the so-
called PMD fraction (i.e. plastic bottles and flasks, metals and drinks cartons). Note that the standard 
level of service consists of curbside collection of PMD (twice a month) and paper and cardboard (once a 
month) (IVCIE, 2008), and a system of evenly distributed bottle banks throughout the territory of the 
MMO for the collection of glass.3 Next to curbside collection of PMD and paper and cardboard and the 
network of bottle banks, most Belgian municipalities also collect packaging waste via municipal recycling 
or drop-off centers. It is important to mention that the standard level of service can be considered as a 
minimum. Some MMOs opt to provide additional services such as supplementary collection rounds of 
PMD or even curbside collection of glass.  
In Portugal, selective collection of packaging waste is mainly organized via drop-off containers and drop-
off centers. The density of the drop-off points is higher compared to Belgium, as about 32,614 drop-off 
containers and 201 drop-off centers (see Marques et al., 2011) are available throughout Portugal.  
Curbside collection of packaging waste is less common, although some pilot projects are currently in 
effect. However, the total amount of packaging waste collected via curbside collection remains relatively 
low (about 4,4 % of separate collection). Although the level of service in terms of collection frequency 
and collection method might influence the costs of the MMOs in both Belgium and Portugal, it remains 
                                                          
3
 The standard level of service for glass includes a site with bottle banks per 700 or 400 residents depending on the 
population density (IVCIE, 2008). According to Fost Plus about 8,920 sites with one or more bottle banks were 
available in the Belgian territory. 
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difficult to assess a priori which country has higher total collection cost per ton. On the one hand, the 
collection frequency included in the standard level of service in Belgium (i.e. twice a month of PMD and 
once a month for paper and cardboard) is considerably lower than the collection frequency at the drop 
off centers in Portugal (i.e. between once and three times a week). On the other hand, with over 4.6 
million households in Belgium in 2009, the density of pickup points for packaging waste collection is 
higher in Belgium when compared to Portugal (curbside collection is more strongly embedded in the 
Belgian system). Nevertheless, as argued in Rogge and De Jaeger (2013) debate on the impact of the 
density of pick-up points on the cost per ton collected is still on-going, as reductions in driving time 
between pickup points might be offset by constraints caused by congestion.  
 
3.3 Inter-municipal cooperation 
Clearly, IMC can have an important impact on the economic viability of packaging waste recycling. As 
argued by Hulst and van Montfort (2011) rising production scales are often the driver for local 
governments to engage in cooperative arrangements for service delivery. This could also hold for the 
local authorities responsible for collecting and processing packaging waste (i.e. the municipalities in 
Belgium and Portugal), which might generate considerable benefits of scale by cooperating via IMC. Note 
that both in Belgium and in Portugal several alternative cooperation systems are available. As it is not 
our goal to provide the reader with an in depth analysis of the legal basis and institutional arrangements 
that shape IMC for the provision of packaging waste services, we only briefly discuss some key 
characteristics of IMC in these countries before comparing public-private partnerships and contracting 
out decisions between Belgium and Portugal.4 Given the aim of our paper, this focus is driven by the 
relative abundance of studies addressing the impact of contracting out public services on the cost 
structure and the emphasis of public choice and property rights theory on the importance of ownership 
(Bel and Fageda, 2009, Simões et al. 2012 or Simões and Marques, 2012). Nonetheless, at this point it is 
interesting to note that Bel and Warner (2008) found no systematic link between privatization and cost 
savings when reviewing the econometric literature on the production of waste related services. In 
addition the authors argue that due to the absence of competition in such markets, ownership often 
makes little difference on the costs borne by municipalities/ratepayers. Therefore, it remains difficult to 
assess a priori the impact of differences in the management models of IMC between both countries. 
IMC in Belgium is not regulated in the cooperation agreement. Each of the three Belgian regions is still 
responsible for devising its own policy regarding local administrations and IMC (for more details Marques 
et al., 2012c). The regional differences with respect to IMC are evident in the geographic concentration 
across regions. For instance, the Walloon region has recently sought to establish more synergies 
between the existing MMOs by reducing their number and raising their scale efficiency (Wayenberg and 
De Rynck, 2013). The map of Belgium in Figure 2 indeed reveals that IMC is more dispersed in the 
Flemish region than in the Walloon Region. In the Flemish region 304 (out of the 308) municipalities 
organize collection and separation of packaging waste via 20 MMOs, while in the Walloon region all 262 
                                                          
4
 Interested readers can find a more detailed description of IMC in Marques et al. (2011) for Portugal, and Marques 
et al. 2012c for Belgium. 
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municipalities rely on only 7 MMOs for organizing this service. In the Brussels-Capital region a single 
public enterprise responsible for collecting and treating household waste serves all 19 municipalities. 
Note, however, that differences in the geographic concentrations might also be driven by non-political 
factors such as population density or even historic investments in infrastructure.  
Similar to Belgium, municipalities in Portugal have the possibility of relying on multi-municipal systems 
for waste treatment, disposal and, very often, selective collection. In Portugal, the waste sector can be 
clearly divided in two separate segments (see Marques et al., 2011).  The ‘retail’ segment comprises the 
services between the waste collection and the transfer station, while the ‘wholesale’ segment is 
responsible for storing, transportation, sorting, treatment and disposal of urban waste. However, the 
‘wholesale’ companies are, in most cases, responsible for the selective collection of waste (including 
collection of packaging waste). The majority of the wholesale companies in charge of selective collection 
are owned by the central state (via a sub-holding company) and the covered municipalities. 
Nevertheless, other forms of MMOs exist, namely (and important in the context of this paper) there are  
a small number of wholesale MMOs which consist of public-private partnerships (one concession and 
five mixed companies out of a total of 24 MMOs in mainland Portugal).  
In Belgium public-private ownership in the context of IMC differs somewhat between the regions.  In 
Flanders most MMOs responsible for packaging waste collection and separation rely on the so called 
‘Service Associations’ and ‘Mandated Associations’, a cooperation structure which only allows 
participation of municipalities or other MMOs. In the Walloon region most MMOs providing waste 
related services also associate with the respective province (in Belgium the Flemish and Walloon regions 
are further subdivided into a total of ten provinces) and associations with private partners are usually an 
exception.  
Finally, in both Belgium and Portugal MMOs can decide to contract out certain waste related services. In 
Belgium about half of the MMOs outsource collection of packaging waste to a third party. Figure 2a 
displays the geographic dispersal of contracting collection of PMD. As contracting out collection activities 
of glass and paper and cardboard is, with a few exceptions, similar to the situation of PMD, the map for 
glass and paper and cardboard is not included in this paper. For separation activities the situation is 
different. As shown in Figure 2b only three MMOs organize separation activities themselves. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
In Portugal contracting out is mainly confined to refuse collection (undifferentiated flow). In fact, 
municipalities are responsible for urban waste ‘retail’ services but lately they have been contracting out 
these services to a greater extent (Cruz et al. 2013). As mentioned above, selective collection is mostly 
carried out by the ‘wholesale’ (regional) companies. These operators also perform the sorting of the 
selectively collected waste themselves. The most representative type of management model is the 
multimunicipal company, which consists of partnerships between a public company owned by the 
central state (Empresa Geral de Fomento - EGF) and the covered municipalities. EGF owns 51% of the 
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shares in these companies while the municipalities hold the remainder (see EIMPack, 2011a). There are 
12 multimunicipal concessionaries in operation. Alternatively, local governments also created 
intermunicipal companies (100% municipally-owned or resulting from institutionalized public-private 
partnerships – mixed companies) for the delivery of these services. There are eight intermunicipal 
companies delivering ‘wholesale’ waste services in Portugal. Finally, there are four associations of 
municipalities (direct public management), two intermunicipal services (direct public management) and 
one private concessionaire operating in this segment. To refer to the waste management systems we will 
use the term “municipal systems and local authorities” (SMAUT in the Portuguese acronym) irrespective 
of the institutional arrangements. Figure 3 presents the different management models for the selective 
collection and sorting of household packaging waste in Portugal. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
3.4 Financial support for the MMOs 
As outlined in section 2 the Green Dot companies in Belgium and Portugal finance the MMOs for the 
selective collection and separation of packaging waste. Nevertheless, the design of the compensation 
scheme differs considerably between both countries. The compensation paid by the Portuguese Green 
Dot company is calculated based on a variable fee per ton. A key characteristic of this system is that the 
level of the fee per ton depends on a certain per capita rate of packaging waste sorting (see Cruz et al., 
2012). By raising the level of the fee per ton if certain thresholds are met, financial incentives to increase 
efficiency are well rooted in the Portuguese compensation system.  
In Belgium the scheme is primarily designed to allow for a reimbursement of the full cost incurred by 
MMOs for providing a pre-defined standard level of service. In order to reach this goal, four alternative 
scenarios are used: 
1) Since many MMOs outsource their packaging waste related services to a third party (see section 
3.2), the Green Dot company can reimburse the MMO according to the costs per material reported 
on the outsourcing contract. 
2) Alternatively, the Green Dot company and the MMO can agree on a so called reference cost. This 
cost is paid by packaging material and consists of a variable part (40% of the reference cost depends 
on the amount collected) and a fixed part (60% depends on the number of residents). Note that the 
resulting reference cost should correspond to the average cost of the first scenario. If the MMO can 
provide proof for a different cost structure, the Green Dot company can decide to use an alternative 
proportion of the fixed and variable components of the reference cost. 
3) In case the MMO decides not to outsource its collection and separation services of packaging waste, 
the level of the reimbursement can be determined by mutual agreement between the Green Dot 
company and the MMO. 
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4) If a utility decides to complement the standard level of service with additional collection rounds, the 
Green Dot company reimburses the full cost for the “standard” level of service per flow of packaging 
waste, while additional quantities are reimbursed with a special contribution. For the plastic and 
metal, the contribution corresponds to 50% (at least) of the “standard” cost per ton and per 
material. For the other type of materials, the “standard” cost per ton is fixed at €160. 
Besides the financial supports described above, the Green Dot companies in Belgium and Portugal pay 
also a number of complementary fees. In Belgium such additional compensations include, amongst 
others, fees for communication and information campaigns (€0.25 per resident), a bonus for low PMD 
residue after sorting and compensations for monitoring the outsourcing contracts. In Portugal the 
additional fees are limited to a report fee for packaging waste that is not recovered or recycled via the 
selective collection chain and an information and motivation fee for trade and industrial packaging waste 
sent for recycling. 
The differences between Belgium and Portugal with respect to the main focus of the compensation 
scheme can have a considerable impact on the economic viability of the packaging waste strategies for 
the municipalities and MMOs. In Belgium, providing the standard level of service almost automatically 
implies that the financial cost is entirely covered by the contributions made by the Green Dot company. 
In Portugal, on the other hand, the cost structure of the MMOs, the amount of packaging waste 
collected and the potential avoided costs will be crucial determinants of the economic viability of the 
system.  
 
4. Economic analysis methodology 
The present paper comprises an economic analysis5 of the packaging waste recycling in Belgium and in 
Portugal based on costs and revenues (adopting strictly financial and economic perspectives). For the 
cost measurement, the following were considered: a) operational and maintenance expenses (taking 
into account the cost associated with selective collection and sorting); b) the depreciation of assets 
(allocated to the selective collection and sorting facilities); and c) the return on capital employed (debt 
and equity), concerning the investment allocated to selective collection and sorting facilities. Regarding 
the (financial) benefits quantification, the following were taken into account: a) the financial support for 
local authorities (FSLA, that is, the values paid by the Green Dot company); b) other revenues (which are 
attained from direct transactions with recyclers); and c) subsidies to investment (that is, the ones 
allocated to selective collection and sorting assets). Moreover, as an economic benefit, the savings that 
derive from the diversion of waste from refuse collection and other treatment activities (e.g. landfilling, 
mechanical-biological treatment – MBT – or incineration) were considered. The economic and financial 
analysis of recycling of packaging waste comprises the measurement of the costs and benefits referred 
to, and also identified in Figure 4, for the 27 SMAUTs and the 37 Belgium MMOs in charge of the 
                                                          
5
 However, in this paper, the economic analysis only takes into account the money that local authorities save by 
diverting the packaging waste from the refuse collection circuits and final disposal. Environmental or social impacts 
are not considered. 
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selective collection and sorting, covering the entire Belgium and Portuguese population. Our analysis 
concerns the management of the household flow and reports to the year of 2010. The trade and industry 
flow does not involve selective collection and sorting operations (the packaging waste is sorted at the 
source and collected by specialized waste management operators that receive the information and 
motivation fee). Figure 4 shows the diverse components identified that constitute the cost-benefit 
analysis of the recycling system in Portugal and Belgium. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
As already mentioned, in this paper the costs and revenues are accounted for adopting the perspective 
of the local authorities responsible for collecting and processing municipal solid waste (i.e. the 
municipalities or the MMOs). The methodology used is based on an economic and financial model which 
establishes a balance between costs and benefits related to the activities of selective collection and 
sorting carried out by the MMOs. 
On the costs side, the costs of operation and maintenance (taking into account the cost associated with 
service provision), depreciations of fixed assets and return on capital employed (debt and equity) were 
considered in the financing of fixed assets allocated to the activities referred to above. Note that for 
Belgium the operational costs only include the costs for a standard level of service. Some MMOs opt to 
provide additional services such as supplementary collection rounds of PMD or curbside collection of 
glass. As mentioned in the previous chapter these costs are only partly reimbursed by Fost Plus via the 
additional fees. Unfortunately, the full costs for the additional services are not available. Therefore the 
operational costs used in this calculation might not always reflect the full operational costs of all MMOs. 
Nevertheless the decision to provide additional facilities for the residents – a decision which is always 
taken at the local level – is linked to the level of service and not to the general functioning of the system. 
Given the goal of this study (an analysis of the economic viability of the systems), considering the full 
cost of the additional services is less relevant for the general conclusion (since local authorities are not 
required to undertake these costs and increasing the level of service beyond the legal obligations is at 
their discretion). 
Regarding the collection of data for the 37 MMOs in charge of collection and treatment of household 
waste in Belgium and the 27 SMAUTs in Portugal, some of the required variables were obtained from the 
annual activity reports for the year 2010 while others were calculated. The majority of the information 
used was obtained directly (through surveys) from the MMOs. However, in particular circumstances, it 
was necessary to use the information from their annual account reports.  
The financial support, the other revenues (e.g. the revenue from selling non-packaging paper that is 
discarded in drop-off containers is included in this component) and the subsidies to the investment were 
mainly declared in the survey sent to the MMOs. The subsidies are accounted annually and adjusted in 
the same proportion as the depreciation of the subsidized assets. The “other benefits”, obtained from 
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the diversion of the waste from landfill, were calculated considering the costs of refuse collection and 
the other types of waste treatment, being calculated separately and according to equations (1) and (2). 
Note that the savings from the diversion of packaging waste of refuse collection circuits and other 
treatment are not financial benefits (i.e. they do not represent revenue). However, considering these 
avoided costs is quite relevant for local authorities. 
 












      













For this calculation, the values of Tables 2 and 3 for the variables presented below were used, for 
Belgium and Portugal respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The quantity of packaging waste of each material collected through selective collection is not equal to 
the quantity of packaging waste recycled, providing evidence of the efficiency of sorting. The residues of 
the sorting process are usually sent to landfills, so this cost is not avoided for a small percentage of the 
packaging waste selectively collected (note that for plastics this percentage is not irrelevant). 
On the costs side, the operational costs of selective collection and sorting and the depreciation of the 
assets allocated to these activities were obtained from the survey results and from the annual accounts 
of the MMOs. The return on capital employed regarding the investments made on selective collection 
and sorting equipment and infrastructure was calculated through equations (3) and (4). The values of the 
variables are presented in Table 4.  
 




(Depreciation - subsidies) 
(€) 
× 











= Cost of equity × 
Equity 
+ Cost of debt × Debt (4) 
(1 -  corporate tax) 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5. Economic analysis of Recycling 
The methodology used to carry out the economic analysis of recycling services comprises the balance 
between the economic and financial costs and benefits of selective collection and sorting activities, 
carried out by the Belgian MMOs and the Portuguese SMAUTs, whose results are graphically shown in 
Figure 5. This analysis was developed considering the quantity (in tons) of waste collected. MMOs 
benefited 286€ per ton of packaging waste collected in 2010, considering the avoided costs. In a strictly 
financial perspective (not taking into account the avoided costs), the benefits represented 126€ per ton. 
Since financial benefits cover the costs of the service (in fact, the cost coverage is around 90% from a 
financial perspective). Hence, the current Belgian recycling system is financially sustainable and has no 
public money directly involved. However, considering the (significant) avoided costs seems to be quite 
relevant. Indeed, this could be an incentive for local authorities to go beyond the “standard 
requirements” in terms of selective collection. Diverting more packaging waste from the undifferentiated 
flow may significantly reduce the costs with urban waste management for the municipalities. 
Conversely, in Portugal there is public money involved. On average, the SMAUTs benefit 260€ per ton of 
packaging waste collected. Adopting a strictly financial perspective, the benefits are significantly reduced 
to the value of 158 € per ton of waste collected. Regarding the cost perspective, selective collection and 
sorting of packaging waste represent 204€ per ton collected for the SMAUTs. Note that the unit costs 
and benefits were weighted by the tons sorted by each SMAUT. As can easily be observed in Figure 5, 
currently the cost coverage is around 128% considering an economic perspective but only 77% if the cost 
savings due to recycling are not taken into account. The question about the fairness of financial transfers 
has to be raised. If an economic approach was followed, the FSLA should be globally reduced around 
43%, but if the policy was to make the industry 100% accountable for its packaging waste, that is 
excluding other benefits and subsidies from analysis and exempting local authorities from any financial 
responsibility (like in the German Dual System, MS2 and Perchards, 2009), the FSLA should increase by 
35%. 
Note that the operational costs in Belgium seem relatively small in comparison to the operational costs 
for Portugal. One of the reasons is the difference in collection frequency. The standard level of service in 
Belgium includes curbside collection twice a month of PMD and once a month for paper and cardboard 
(IVCIE, 2008), while, for instance, in Portugal this service is provided 1 to 3 times per week. Indeed, the 
climate has clearly an important impact on the cost structure of local authorities regarding waste 
management. Such lower frequencies in Portugal would not be admissible because the warmer weather 




[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
Figure 6 shows the operational costs of the recycling service per packaging waste flow in Belgium and 
Portugal. Not surprisingly the recycling system costs (selective collection and sorting activities) depend 
on the material flow considered, since it has different characteristics. In Belgium, the lower service cost 
of the glass waste (in comparison with other packaging waste materials, mainly the PMD flow) can be 
justified by its high weight and density which significantly reduce the collection cost. PMD, on the other 
hand, has a relatively low density (a full collection truck contains approximately 3 tons of PMD). In 
Belgium PMD is collected every two weeks at the curbside, which explains the relative high service cost 
for this packaging flow. Finally, paper and cardboard is also collected at the curbside, but only once a 
month, while the density is considerably higher than the PMD flow (a full collection truck contains 
approximately 9 tons of paper and cardboard).  
In Portugal, there are also several characteristics distinguishing the different (costs) flows in the recycling 
of packaging waste. The glass waste selectively collected from drop-off containers is not sorted and its 
high density provides a lower collection frequency (when compared to other materials), which 
significantly reduces the operational costs. The high costs of the PMD flow reveal the difficulty for the 
SMAUTs to invest on the plastic and metals flow. In fact, in this particular flow, sorting remains with high 
operational cost and low efficiency when compared with the other flows, increasing the weight and 
relevance of these costs in the SMAUTs’ cost structures (see Figure 6). 
 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
The costs of the service were separated into costs of selective collection and costs of packaging waste 
sorting. The results are presented in Figure 7 both for Belgium and Portugal. It is concluded that the 
global cost of selective collection in Belgium is 96€ per ton of packaging waste collected and the cost of 
sorting is 179€ per ton effectively sent for sorting. Note that in Belgium the PMD flow is the only waste 
flow which is sorted after collection (paper/cardboard and glass waste are stored and/or sent directly to 
recycling). In fact, sorting corresponds to about 46% of the total cost of the “preparation for recycling” 
service. In Portugal, we can observe that the global cost of sorting is 101€ per ton sorted (plastic/metal 
and paper/cardboard, since the glass waste is sent for the sorting stations but it is not effectively sorted) 
and the global cost of selective collection is 133€ per ton collected. These results further support the 
highest cost for the plastic and metal flows. It is interesting to note that the lower costs of the service in 
Belgium are mainly due to the savings attained with the lower collection frequencies. In fact, the unit 
cost of sorting is higher in Belgium than in Portugal (which is expected, since the cost of living is higher in 




[Insert Figure 7 here] 
 
The economic and financial model was also analyzed according to the population density of the MMOs 
and SMAUTs. The results are shown in Figures 8 and 9.7 In Belgium, the recycling system is financially 
sustainable for all levels since cost coverage is assured by Fost Plus. However, the operational costs are 
slightly higher for MMOs with lower population densities. This tendency is not observed for the 
Portuguese SMAUTs (in fact, it seems that the best balance between costs and benefits is achieved by 
the SMAUTs under 250 inhabitants per km2). In Belgium the operational costs are, on average, lower 
than in Portugal. In addition to the collection frequency issue, these results can also be explained by the 
geography of both countries; in Portugal there is even a substantial difference between the North and 
South, with many more mountains and hills in the North and then in the South. Indeed, the SMAUTs with 
higher operational costs are located in the North characterized by a dispersed population placed in 
mountains. Conversely, the SMAUTs with lower operational costs are located in the Centre (which 
provide evidence of contrasting characteristics). 
 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
 
[Insert Figure 9 here] 
 
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the cost recovery (the ratio between all benefits and all costs) of the MMOs 
in Belgium and Portugal, respectively. We observe that in Belgium the costs recovery is not always above 
the 100% (i.e. the costs are not covered by the benefits). As we observe higher operational costs by 
urban MMOs, in Portugal the cost recovery is also higher for the rural ones. This circumstance might be 
related to the need for complex technology (and higher investments) of the urban SMAUTs considering 
the highest volume of packaging waste dealt with. In addition, this situation can also be instigated by 
other questions related to the “congestion phenomenon”, which is more relevant in densely populated 
areas. 
 
[Insert Figure 10 here] 
 
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
 
Finally, Table 5 presents the average unit operational costs (per collected ton) of the recycling system for 
public and private (including PPP arrangements) waste management operators. Apparently, private 
                                                          
7
 The weighted average is based on the tonnes collected. 
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models seem to report lower operational costs (except for sorting facilities in Belgium). Nevertheless, the 
observations are not sufficient to generate statistically significant results. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
The recycling of packaging waste has been a matter of great concern among the European member 
states in the last decade. In Belgium, the implementation of the European Directive 94/62/EC on PPW 
has been quite successful in terms of recycling rates and in the application of the extended producer 
responsibility principle. In Portugal, all annual packaging waste recycling targets have also been met 
recently. Fost Plus in Belgium and SPV in Portugal are the Green Dot companies that manage the 
packaging waste recycling system of the household packaging waste flow. The success of the systems 
should be recognized not only by their effectiveness in terms of target achievement, but also by their 
financial-economic sustainability. 
This research investigates the viability of the recycling system of packaging waste in Belgium and 
Portugal, by means of an economic and financial analysis focused on the household flow. It innovates by 
comparing two countries with similar institutional frameworks/arrangements but different targets, 
service delivery models, collection methods and financing mechanisms; it also innovates in terms of 
methodology by including two components that are traditionally left out of these assessments: the 
return on capital employed (debt and equity) regarding the financing of the assets allocated to the 
recycling process and the avoided cost of refuse collection and the other types of waste treatment (such 
as landfill, incineration or MBT). 
Adopting an economic or (strictly) financial approach leads to distinct conclusions (diverging between a 
balanced or unbalanced recycling system). Despite the possible discussion about the “avoided cost”, the 
savings (regarding the other waste treatment facilities; in particular, the landfill) with the waste recycled 
and diverted from the other waste treatment facilities are undeniable. The costs of refuse collection and 
waste treatment are quite expressive and in countries with more limited land resources these costs can 
be even higher (Cruz et al., 2012).  
Indeed, in Portugal the recycling system fairness depends on the approach. The services of selective 
collection and sorting of packaging waste represent on average 204€ per ton collected for the SMAUTs. 
Adopting a strictly financial perspective, the benefits are 158 € per ton of waste collected. The Green Dot 
company (i.e. the industry) in Portugal is bearing only a part of the financial costs of the recycling system 
(around 77%). Nevertheless, adopting an economic analysis the benefits outweigh the costs to the value 
of 260 € per ton of waste collected, with a cost coverage of 128%. In the case of Belgium, the argument 
about the avoided costs in the economic-financial balance may be different, since the financial benefits 
cover practically all the costs of the packaging waste service. In fact, about 90% of the total costs of the 
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service are covered by the financial benefits, since Fost Plus only finances the costs related to the 
“standard” level of service. At this level, the service cost is around 140€ per ton of packaging waste 
collected and the financial benefits sum 126€ per ton. However, it is noteworthy that the avoided costs 
(costs with refuse collection and other waste treatments) are around 160€ per ton of packaging waste 
collected, being higher than the costs of selective collection and sorting. These figures may contribute 
significantly for the high recycling rates attained by this country. On the contrary, in Portugal, the 
avoided costs are 103€ per ton of packaging waste collected, which is lower than the recycling costs. 
Therefore, the SMAUTs could increase the gate fees of incineration and, in particular, landfilling in order 
to raise the quantities of packaging waste sent for recycling. 
The analysis made according to the population density showed that the packaging waste recycling 
system is financially sustainable for all levels in Belgium. In Portugal the same analysis reveals that 
SMAUTs with lower population density present the highest balance between benefits and costs with 
recycling services. These results may be somewhat counterintuitive (larger distances between collection 
points seem to imply higher collection costs). However, it might be the case that congestion effects and 
technological constraints are increasing costs in urban areas. 
This study shows that, from the waste management operators’ standpoint, the recycling system in 
Belgium is sustainable. Moreover, the current system succeeds in achieving (and overcoming) the 
European targets for the recycling and recovery of packaging waste. Portugal has also achieved the 
Directive targets, with a recent important investment in infrastructures related to urban waste 
management. When comparing the operational costs with Belgium, one should bear in mind some 
important characteristics that distinguish both countries: the heterogeneity of the landscape and 
population density; the climate that prevents a waste collection with a lower frequency and the maturity 
of the packaging waste recycling system. 
It is noteworthy to emphasize that the pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) scheme implemented in Belgium 
represents one of the most relevant features for the success of the recycling system in this country. Since 
citizens have to pay for the collection of municipal solid waste (undifferentiated waste flow) based on 
the amount they throw away, there is a true financial incentive for users to separate packaging waste. In 
Portugal, households pay for waste services based on water consumption (in their water bill). In this 
regard, since the domestic expenses are not based on waste production, there are no incentives for 
households to change their habits (and increase source separation levels). Indeed, Portugal could invest 
more in citizens’ awareness and create incentives to increase participation in the recycling system (which 
is crucial for the success of recycling). 
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 Figure 1 – General framework of household packaging waste management in Belgium and Portugal 
 
 
Figure 2a: Contracting out PMD curbside collection 
 
Figure 2b: Contracting out PMD separation 
 
Figure 2 – Contracting out of PMD collection and separation 
 
 
 Figure 3 – Management models for the selective collection in Portugal for the year 2010 
 
 Figure 4 – The benefits and costs of recycling in (a) Belgium and in (b) Portugal 
 
 Figure 5 – Service cost recovery considering the tonnes of packaging waste collected in 2010 for (a) 
Belgium and (b) Portugal 
 
 Figure 6 – Operational costs per tonne of packaging waste flow (for Belgium and Portugal) 
 
 Figure 7 – Cost of selective collection and sorting activities  
 
 Figure 8 – Operational costs of MMOs per population density (Belgium) 
 
 Figure 9 – Operational costs of SMAUTs per population density (Portugal) 
 
 Figure 10 – Costs recovery by MMOs per ton collected (Belgium) 
 
 Figure 11 – Costs recovery by the SMAUTs per ton collected (Portugal) 
 
Table 1 – Comparison of the packaging waste sector between Belgium and Portugal for the year 2010 
(Sources: authors own elaboration; Fost Plus, 2011; Adams, 2011; Pinckaers, 2012). 
 Belgium Portugal 
General statistics 
Population 10,839,905 10,637,713 
Surface [km²] 30,530 92,090 
Pop. density [pop/km²] 360 116 
Number of municipalities 589 308 
Municipal and multimunicipal organizations (MMOs) 












Kg/cap separately collected via the green dot system 



















Paper/cardboard 60% 60% 
Glass 60% 60% 
Plastics 30% 22,5% 
Metals 50% 50% 
Global recycling 80% 55-80% 
Financial transfers (from the Green Dot Agencies) including complementary fee
b
 
Collection paper/cardboard [€ per capita] 1.11 1.48
c
 
Collection and sorting PMD [€ per capita] 5.54 3.19
c
 
Collection glass [€ per capita] 1.49 0.64
c
 
Legend: standard deviation (if available) between brackets 
a
 Ratio between the quantities of packaging waste recycled and produced. For Portugal, the national 
targets were the same defined in the PPW Directive 
b
 In Portugal, SPV pays complementary fees for packaging waste that is recovered or recycled through 
the ‘traditional’ refuse collection chain (e.g. via MBT or incineration) 
c
 Estimates based on surveys 
 
Table 2 – Variables and values used in the methodology for the Belgium case 
Value Observation Source 
Unit costs of 
refuse collection 
60 €/ton 
This value is based on the costs reported 
by MMOs to OVAM. OVAM
a
 used the 
costs for 2005 to estimate the value for 
2010. This value was weighted by the 
waste collected. 
OVAM (2008) 






Environmental tax incineration: 7,43€/t 
Landfilling: 50€/t 
Environmental tax landfilling: 42€/t 
This value was weighted by the different 










These values are based on the figures 
reported by Fost Plus and IVCIE
b
 and are 
averages for Belgium as a whole. Regional 
differences might still exist. 
Official statistics: 
 





OVAM is the Flemish Public Waste Agency 
b IVCIE is the Interregional Packaging Commission (the competent authority for the certification of packaging waste 
management companies such as Fost Plus) 
Table 3 – Variables and values used in the methodology for the Portuguese case 
Value Observation Source 
Unit costs of  
refuse collection  
(€/ton) 
49,0 
This value was taken from a survey sent to 308 
operators (corresponding to the number of 
Portuguese municipalities), from which 196 have 
answered (corresponding to about 80% of the 
Portuguese population). This value was weighted 
by the waste collected. 
Survey 




This value was obtained considering the 27 
SMAUT (covering the entire Portuguese 
population) for the wholesale sector. In this 
regard, we exclude from the operational costs 
the costs with selective collection and sorting. 














This assumption was taken from the answers 
obtained from the SMAUT surveyed. This value 
was weighted by the waste selectively collected. 
Survey 
 
Table 4 – Variables used to measure the return on capital employed 
Value Observation 
Useful life of the assets (years) 9,6 
This value was achieved considering the 
assets and their depreciation. This value 
was weighted by the waste selectively 
collected. 
Cost of equity (%) 6,0 
This value takes into account a non-risk (of 
3%) and a risk premium (of 3%, related to 
the German Treasury Bonds). 
Equity in the capital structure (%) 19,0 
This value was defined considering the 
weight that equity has on the capital 
structure of the SMAUT (i.e. in relation to 
the passive). This value was weighted by 
the waste selectively collected. 
Corporate tax (%) 
34,0 (Belgium) 
20,3 (Portugal) 
This value was calculated according to the 
(national) tax paid by the companies and 
the level of “rurality”, since there are some 
exceptions (reductions of taxes). This value 
was weighted by the waste selectively 
collected. 
Cost of debt (%) 4,6 
This value was achieved considering the 
interests paid for the SMAUT loans. This 
value was weighted by the waste 
selectively collected. 
 
Table 5 – Unit operational costs per management model (public or private) 
Waste activity 
Public management Private management 
Belgium Portugal Belgium Portugal 
Selective collection 100,62 €/ton 126,73 €/ton 81,57 €/ton 106,86 €/ton 
Sorting 165,68 €/ton 97,22 €/ton 167,09 €/ton 79,43 €/ton 
 
